

VIETNAM

'Doi Moi', Current Conjuncture and
Aspirational Future*

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THE CONTEXT

'Doi moi',¹ announced in 1986, marked the start of one of the most remarkable societal transformations of the 20th century in one generation. The period since then also fortuitously coincides with and is closely interwoven with my own personal journey and experiences over a 35-year period to and in Vietnam which began in 1989 when the implementation of doi moi began in real earnest. This has given me a perspective, from many different angles and levels, spanning the grassroots to the macro policy level, on the country's astonishing transformation. It has taught me that, more than anything else, the country's strength resides in the hard and painstaking work, resilience, forward-looking, forgiving nature, openness and optimism of its people. This will always be the case, whatever challenges the country faces. This cannot be equally or easily said for many other countries.

Doi moi can be considered the starting point for all that Vietnam has achieved not just economically and policy-wise, but also politically and institutionally so far, after the American War which finally ended on 30 April 1975. It is also the reason why Vietnam can dream of being a developed country by 2045, the centenary of its independence. This article traces Vietnam's political, economic, institutional and policy trajectory from doi moi till the current conjuncture and briefly discusses its aspirational future.

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FROM DOI MOI TILL THE 13TH PARTY CONGRESS IN 2021

POLITICAL TRAJECTORY AND PARTY CONSOLIDATION

Doi Moi was launched after a series of internal political debates, based on the real situation on the ground in 1985. The erstwhile Soviet Union had announced sharp cuts in its aid to the country that year due to the severe economic crisis it was facing at home. For many years previously, aid from the Soviet Union had contributed approximately 75 per cent of Vietnam's national budget.

Doi moi's implementation was initially led and overseen by Vietnam's top leaders at the time, Do Muoi (June 1988–August 1991), but especially Vo Van Kiet (March–June 1988, August 1991–September 1997), first in their role as Chairmen of the Council of Ministers and then, in the case of Vo Van Kiet, as the reformist Prime Minister to whom, it is widely believed, the most credit is due. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai (September 1997–June 2006) should also be credited.

His successor, for a decade, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, brought relatively rapid economic liberalisation to Vietnam with more space for civil society and dissent, but this was unfortunately accompanied by rampant corruption and a significant decline in respect for the Party by many ordinary Vietnamese, a legacy Vietnam is still recovering from. His successor, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who was Prime Minister and then President between 2016 and 2023, was also an economic reformer but resigned as President in early 2023 ('as per his personal wish'). Two Deputy Prime Ministers had also left earlier 'as per their personal request'. Media reports indicated that all three of them had made these 'requests' because of serious corruption charges levelled either against people personally close to them or under their responsibility. President Phuc's successor also 'requested' to leave earlier this year after barely completing a year in office while the Chair of Vietnam's National Assembly also left early in 2024 for similar reasons. Another Deputy Prime Minister was stripped of his Central Committee and other responsibilities as recently as early August 2024.

The current Prime Minister, Pham Minh Chinh, was appointed in April 2021 after the last Party Congress held in late January that year. Unlike his predecessors, he comes from a long career in the police and has a public security background.

The Communist Party of Vietnam's (CPV) General Secretary position is *primus inter pares* amongst its 'four pillars' (Party General Secretary, President, Prime Minister, Chair of the National Assembly). The previous Party General Secretary Trong, sadly, passed in July 2024. He had been in this position since 2011 and was one of the few genuine statesmen in today's world of many illiberal leaders.

Blazing furnace, the anti-corruption campaign, led on the ground by General To Lam, the erstwhile Minister of Public Security, led to the aforesaid multiple resignations from amongst the four pillars, many of whom were considered the General's rivals for the top positions of President or Party General Secretary. Such resignations are unprecedented and have never been witnessed in the last seven decades.

Comrade Trong received a funeral befitting his post and stature. The outpouring of grief on 26 July 2024 was spontaneous and genuine. The enormous respect shown by the Vietnamese people was, at one level, a recognition of his simplicity, humbleness, humility, selfless life and commitment to country above all else. It was also a tribute to his unblemished, corruption free persona and the sustained anti-corruption campaign that he had led since 2013 in consecutive regimes marred by corruption. His moral uprightness also granted him the unique authority to stand above factional interests within the Party and Government.

With Comrade Trong's passing, the old generation of Vietnamese leaders is truly gone, and Vietnam has been left with a leadership void which will be challenging to fill, not just because of his personal attributes but because of his political and economic legacy and diplomatic acumen.

Vietnam, in 2024, therefore, is at a crucial watershed once again, just like it was in 1945, 1954, 1975 and 1986. It is truly an extraordinary and worrying time in Vietnamese history.

General Secretary Trong's passing leaves his successors with a big challenge in terms of successfully using Marxist-Leninist ideology to undergird many state policies like he did. His vision for Vietnam to develop along the path to socialism and become a developed country by 2045 suddenly looks much more vulnerable.

General Secretary Trong was the Party's most eminent recent Marxist theoretician. He led a series of publications when he was Editor-in-Chief of the *Communist Review* (1991–1996), and later, Chairman of the Central Theoretical Council (2001–2007). These have been hugely influential for the political and economic trajectory of Vietnam since *doi moi*. Notably, he rejected the orthodox Marxist interpretation of the world as being in a constant struggle between capitalism and socialism. This led to the articulation of Vietnam as 'a market economy with socialist orientation', a pragmatic description of the Vietnamese economy as it has evolved over the four decades since *doi moi*.

When Comrade Trong came to occupy Vietnam's most powerful position in 2011, his overarching purpose was to place the Party back at center stage in Vietnamese society and politics after its fall from grace during the early Dung years which had witnessed rampant corruption because of relatively unregulated economic liberalisation. His perception of corruption as the biggest threat to the Party was based on his research on what had happened in the now disbanded Soviet Union in and after 1991. Internally, within the CPV, because of his stature and clean image, he was able to frame anti-corruption not as in-fighting in the Party, but as a moral crusade to save it. He sought to restore the public's faith in the CPV's rule and thereby bring back and maintain its political legitimacy.

He pursued his central objective regardless of the cost, since he genuinely believed that the Party best represented the interests of the people. If viewed from a political and civil rights lens, the cost was indeed considerable in terms of shrinking space for any form of civil society or other dissent, and in terms of the suppression of civil and political rights and freedom of the press. This was a cost he was willing to bear for what he regarded as the larger national interest.

In terms of the political economy of the country, Comrade Trong closely followed the Chinese precedent of economic reform with minimal political reform on which there was and remains consensus at the highest levels of the Party's now dominant hardline faction.

On foreign policy, and despite his background as a Soviet-trained ideologue, Comrade Trong's approach was driven more

by pragmatism than ideological affinity² and is best epitomised by Vietnam's now famous 'bamboo diplomacy' ('strong roots, stout trunk and flexible branches')³ which has guided its great power (US, China) hedging. This has been underpinned by the four 'No's', officially articulated in a 2019 Defense White Book. This important document defines and elaborates what Vietnam means by non-alignment: 'no military alliances; no siding with one country against another; no foreign military bases; and no using Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries'. There is also an important fifth 'No', i.e., 'no using force or threatening to use force in international relations'. Externally, his theoretical framework also influenced the country's strong and unwavering commitment to multilateralism.

Three of Party General Secretary Trong's four main objectives (anti-corruption, regained political legitimacy for the Party, global economic integration, foreign policy hedging between the great powers)⁴ were fully achieved before his death. The fourth, rooting out corruption, has also seen progress.

There is, however, now, a real and imminent danger of a roll-back on at least some of these objectives because of potential in-fighting between different factions in the Party, as well as government paralysis and low morale amongst certain Party cadres and government officials⁵ which has grown over the past three years because of the weaponisation of the anti-corruption campaign.⁶ General To Lam who has led it on the ground over the last few years has used it to effectively and systematically weed out any rivals in his quest for the top Party leadership posts⁷ as well as to pressure senior technocratic Central Committee and senior Government officials regarded by him as too reformist to resign.⁸

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RENOVATION

Vietnam was amongst the world's fastest growing economies for the last several years, having grown at an average of 6 to 7 per cent per annum over the past decade. The country had a 2.9 per cent GDP growth rate even at the height of COVID-19 in 2020 when most of the world was in recession. Its economic growth rate in 2023 was still a respectable 5 per cent even if it fell short of its 6.5 per cent target. The latest available update on

its economic growth forecast is 6.3 per cent for 2024 and 6.5 per cent for 2025.⁹

The country's GDP per capita income increased 40 times between 1989 and 2023. This is a dramatic increase, albeit from a very low base (its GDP per capita income in 1984 was between USD 200–300, about the lowest in the world at that time). Furthermore, Vietnam, despite years of war with the French, Americans, Chinese and Japanese, had attained a GDP per capita income of USD 3,817 in 2023 at constant prices, considerably higher than the USD 2,239 GDP per capita of India in the same year. Moreover, at least 40 million people out of its close to 100 million population have escaped poverty since 1993 and its multi-dimensional poverty rate has halved since 2005. By 2023, Vietnam had reduced its poor and nearly poor households to around only 1.6 million, representing approximately 5.7 per cent of its population.¹⁰ Some estimates put this even lower in 2022 at 4 per cent.

END OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND UNWAVERING COMMITMENT TO MULTILATERALISM

The United States only lifted its 30-year trade embargo against Vietnam in 1993. The US had also exercised its veto power in the United Nations (UN) Security Council for two consecutive years from 1975 to prevent Vietnam from joining the UN. This changed when President Jimmy Carter and the Democrats came to power. The UN had, throughout, lobbied and advocated with its Member States consistently for Vietnam to join the United Nations. It finally did so in September 1977. Joining the UN was a great opportunity and helped Vietnam end its complete political and social isolation.

In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, UN assistance accounted for 60 per cent of the total aid offered to Vietnam. Indeed, Vietnam received tremendous support from the UN—political, humanitarian, reconstruction—as well as critical policy advice during *doi moi* in 1986 and beyond. Later, it received UN support for the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG), all of which it amazingly achieved ahead of the 2015 deadline. The latest five-year One UN Strategic Plan (2021–26) continues to support Vietnam in the achievement of the much more difficult Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) by 2030.

Vietnam's increasing contributions over the past six years to UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, especially in South Sudan, are one of its current outstanding contributions to the UN and multilateralism more broadly. This is particularly inspiring because it symbolises Vietnam coming full circle after being at war for decades. It is now playing a significant role in helping bring about and maintain global peace in some of the world's most protracted and intractable conflict zones. Vietnam also championed UN Development System Reform two decades ago when it became the leading pilot country for the global One UN initiative which it has remained at the global forefront of ever since. Vietnam has also been assuming, as it should, a higher profile in the regional arena. It was the ASEAN Chair in 2020.

The country has much to offer the rest of the world. This includes lessons from its large-scale effective income and multi-dimensional poverty reduction successes and its containment of COVID-19 between the pandemic's outset in late 2019 till at least mid-2021, during which period it arguably had the world's best outcome. It had only 35 deaths in a population of close to 100 million at that time, a remarkable achievement by any standards. Vietnam is also the best example of a country which has, through its home grown bamboo diplomacy, demonstrated how middle-sized countries can successfully manage their relationship with China.

The Vietnamese have long memories. While the country has indeed moved on, Vietnam's leaders and people will not easily or quickly forget the roles which the UN, India, Sweden, the Soviet Union and certain international NGOs such as Oxfam played in their hours and years of greatest need. On the other hand, the Vietnamese people remain wary of the Chinese because of their fraught 1,000-year history. As a result, neither the Party nor the Government can be seen to be openly supporting the People's Republic of China, especially given the continuing political sensitivity of China's trespass in what the Vietnamese consider their territory in the East Sea (what the world calls the South China Sea).

While it is widely believed that the last Party General Secretary brought Vietnam closer to China than at any time in recent history, this is at least debatable, because he also signed

a Strategic Partnership agreement with the US in 2013 which was elevated to the highest Comprehensive Strategic Partnership level in September 2023 when President Biden visited Vietnam at his invitation. Comrade Trong also made a historic trip to Washington DC, becoming the first CPV General Secretary to be hosted in the White House since the end of the American War. He signed a joint Vision Statement with President Obama on that occasion, which, among other issues, expressed joint concern about developments in the South China Sea.

The Chinese have traditionally been close to General To Lam, who now occupies two of the four pillars, the posts of President and Party General Secretary. He was officially elected to the latter post, the most powerful in the country, on 3 August 2024 by full consensus in the Party's Central Committee. He is the first Minister of Public Security to ever occupy this position and will retain it till at least the Party Congress in January 2026, at which forum he is likely to be re-elected for another five-year term, further consolidating his power.

The Chinese know him well from his previous public security and policing roles. While it is too early to tell how he will play his hand now that he is Vietnam's most powerful person, he is known to be a pragmatist like his predecessor. He is certainly not an ideologue; nor does he have the deep theoretical grounding in Marxist–Leninist thought that Dr. Trong accumulated and demonstrated over decades.

His first official trip overseas since he was appointed Party General Secretary was to China from 18 to 20 August 2024. While unsurprising, given his close personal ties to China, this choice was nevertheless significant. The visit focused on deepening and elevating the existing comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries, including boosting defense and security ties. Fourteen new agreements were signed between Presidents Xi and To Lam, ranging from cross-border railways to crocodile exports.¹¹

Despite the closer ties that are likely to develop between China and Vietnam under General Lam's leadership, it is likely that Vietnam will make all efforts to maintain its famous bamboo diplomacy, keeping both the United States and China as close allies simultaneously. However, this will, no doubt, become

both increasingly and incredibly hard to sustain in the current polarised global and regional Indo–Pacific geopolitical and geo-economic contexts.

THE CURRENT CONJUNCTURE

POLITICAL

Despite its remarkable achievements since *doi moi*, Vietnam has been facing enormous political upheavals and challenges since its 13th Party Congress in January 2021.

Blazing furnace has served at least two purposes simultaneously. It has been and remains a much-needed campaign to weed out rampant corruption in the bureaucracy, private sector and Vietnamese society, and it has also served the Party hardline faction's purpose of eliminating reformist technocrats and politicians within the Party and Government. The result has been the elimination of whatever checks and balances had existed in the one-party system because of the now almost total alignment between the Party and Government. In the past, the two could be viewed as parallel structures with overlapping membership in the Politburo which has included several internationally respected competent bureaucrats, technocrats and political figures from the Party's reformist faction till very recently.

Of the current 15 members of the Politburo, 10 (as many as two-thirds) come from either the police or military.¹² The only Politburo members who can be considered technocrats are the former Governor of the State Bank of Vietnam and the Hanoi Party chief. There are only a small handful of remaining vacancies to fill. It is critical that they are filled by internationally well-reputed technocrats if General Lam wishes to build confidence in the Vietnamese people, still influential civilian parts of the Government bureaucracy, as well as among international diplomats, bilateral partners, multilateral institutions, and domestic and international private investors. Two dominant Party faction bureaucrats were recently appointed, on 21 August 2024, as Chairs of the Party Central Economic and Mass Mobilization Committees, positions normally given to Politburo members. This would suggest that they will be the next two Politburo appointments. Neither of them is a well reputed economist or technocrat.

The extraordinary session of the National Assembly on personnel affairs held on 26 August 2024 made clear that the ‘four pillars’ would remain intact and that a new President will be elected during the forthcoming October session of the National Assembly, tentatively planned to be held between 21 October 2024 and no later than end-November. The President is most likely to come from the military to maintain some semblance of balance between the police and military in the four top positions. Three new Deputy Prime Ministers (DPMs) were also appointed during this extraordinary session, bringing the total number of DPMs to five. One of them, who is already a Politburo member, was appointed the new Permanent DPM, the *primus inter-pares* among them. The previous Permanent DPM was recently elevated to the position of Chair of the Party Central Economic Commission. He is a Party bureaucrat, not an economic technocrat.

There is no doubt that Vietnam needs to continue to address corruption, but it should stop weaponising its blazing furnace campaign.¹³ The priority should be to address the root systemic and structural causes of corruption, not only root out individuals, however senior they may be. Even the most senior Party officials who are genuinely guilty are merely the visible symptoms of a now deep-rooted underlying societal malaise. The Party must also take urgent action to prevent continued bureaucratic paralysis, inaction, and the low morale resulting from blazing furnace because it is incapacitating the state.

THE ECONOMY AND ITS CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

At the 13th Party Congress in January 2021, the Communist Party of Vietnam adopted its ambitious vision of becoming a ‘high-income developed country’ by 2045.

Vietnamese policy makers and international observers and commentators should not be lulled into complacency by the country’s remarkable economic achievements since *doi moi*, real though they are. This is because Vietnam currently faces huge economic challenges, especially given its chosen economic path of picking ‘national champions’ like the Vin and Sun Groups, who now operate conglomerate monopolies across the board, ‘chaebol’ style, but without even the minimal competition that South Korea’s ‘chaebol’ faced in their heyday between the 1960s and

1980s. Most of Vietnam's employment does not and will not come from the handful of such conglomerates. The Vietnamese people are largely dependent on formal Government employment or, all too often, informal employment in the millions of enterprises in the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) sector. This sector continues to struggle and includes a disproportionate and overwhelming number of micro-enterprises. Most have very little chance of survival or scaling up.

Moreover, very few of even the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will ever reach the scale and competitiveness needed to survive in the international marketplace. Despite the current challenges facing its SME sector, Vietnam's economic future lies in strategically identifying and growing a handful of its best and most strategic SMEs to scale. To enable this, they would do well to learn from and adapt the Taiwanese SME strategy which has been very successful over the decades. While Taiwan's strategy cannot just be replicated without serious adaptation, and there will be no overnight miracle results even if Vietnamese policy makers and entrepreneurs do successfully learn from Taiwan, such a strategy is much better suited to Vietnam's context than the Republic of Korea's 'chaebol' or Japanese 'flying geese' models which seem to be in fashion in Vietnam today.

It is good that the Republic of Korea, Japan and Singapore have made long-term political stability bets on Vietnam based on which they have made significant long-term investments in the country, as have China and the Republic of Taiwan. They should continue to be reliable partners of Vietnam for the long haul. However, it is the Taiwanese SME experience and lessons that are the most relevant for Vietnam and the country should more actively and consistently seek these out and adapt them to its local and national context.

There has been a lot written and spoken recently about Vietnam being the biggest beneficiary of the supposed China+ investment exodus. Firstly, this assumes that a significant investment exodus from China is both real and continuing, even accelerating. While some investment has, no doubt, left China for other greener pastures, a significant exodus remains questionable and has not yet been credibly documented or substantiated. Even most Taiwanese companies that would like to leave China for

political and other reasons, have, so far, found it hard to find real practical alternatives.

While it is true that Vietnam is benefitting from being part of the supply chains in Southern China which have moved to integrate production with Vietnamese companies, for both proximity and cost-competitive reasons, this has not led to a diversification of the supply chain that Vietnam had hoped for. The country largely remains at the low value end of the garments, electronics and other supply chains.

It is also more than likely that the ongoing integration between Southern Chinese and Northern Vietnamese companies and supply chains would have been a natural progression even without the China+ factor. In any case, a lot of this relates to 'pass through production' for export, penalised by Trump's trade protectionist measures against China in his first term which Biden continued. Such Vietnamese 'pass through production' and exports are not that consequential in a value-added sense. Such economic connivance between the Chinese and Vietnamese will also be counter-productive, especially but not only if there is a Trump 2.0. from January 2025. This is because Vietnam will face significant anti-dumping duties and high tariffs in the US, its biggest export market by far, if Trump returns to the US Presidency. This may also eventuate under a Harris Presidency.

To add to Vietnam's current economic woes, Samsung and LG Electronics are not bringing fresh investments into Vietnam. The latter left the country for a variety of reasons. LG Electronics struggled to find a buyer for its Haiphong plant in 2021 after deciding to shut down its loss-making smartphone operations which were producing roughly 10 million smartphones annually, half of its global output.¹⁴ Thousands of jobs were lost. Two important reasons in this case were monopolistic competition from the Vin Group and a significantly reduced global demand for smartphones.

Samsung and suppliers for Apple and Google were still enthusiastic about Vietnam in 2022. But by mid-2023, global demand for electronics had dropped significantly, casting a shadow over Vietnam. Samsung sales, on which Vietnam is heavily dependent for its export revenues, had sunk by 40 per cent over the previous year because of market saturation resulting

from a slump in global demand for electronics and because of the difficulty of sourcing parts from China. This predicament alone made some 45,000 people in Samsung's Vietnam factory jobless. While Vietnam was the second largest exporter of smartphones in the world in 2021, exports have dropped considerably since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic era buying frenzy, and there are limited prospects of a rebound.

More broadly and equally worryingly for Vietnam, South Korea's foreign direct investment for the first five months of 2023 plunged by 67.6 per cent from 2022 as global demand faltered.¹⁵ Vietnamese statistics corroborated the Republic of Korea's data on this slump.

The US, even as recently as August 2024, has refused to recognise Vietnam as a 'market economy'. This is despite significant positive developments in Vietnam's economy over recent years, and despite Australia, Japan and the UK already having done so. This is a major blow for the country's economy in its most important export market which was worth USD 97 billion, representing 27 per cent of its total export revenue in 2023. Enterprises exporting Vietnamese products to the US market will continue to be treated differently in anti-dumping and countervailing investigations. The 'surrogate value' of a third country will be used to calculate dumping/subsidy margins in such cases.

If the US Department of Commerce had been objective and fair, it would have recognised that Vietnam has been a market economy for quite a while. It has signed and put in place 17 free trade agreements (FTAs) including with the UK, EU and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The country has consciously used these FTAs to initiate and fulfil very difficult internal reforms (on labour standards and unionisation, environmental protection, sustainable development, government procurement, transparency) which would have been impossible to agree to and implement otherwise. While some of these measures have yet to be fully implemented, that is also the case in many market economies.

The US took this decision ill-advisedly. It was taken because of a variety of internal domestic pressures ranging from protectionism to allegations of Vietnam being a conduit

for Chinese exports and also including genuine human rights concerns. The US may well regret this recent discriminatory move against Vietnam¹⁶ since, at the current conjuncture, it could move the country closer to China and Russia, neither of which the US desires since it sees both India and Vietnam as its two most reliable and strategic bulwarks against China in the Indo-Pacific region. This decision has potential implications not just for Vietnam's trade and its economy, but also for its continuing military hardware and arms imports from Russia, which could increase rather than decrease because Vietnam will continue to be denied the level of export revenues it needs to purchase higher priced US arms and military hardware, even if the US is now willing to sell these to Vietnam.

More broadly, and looking ahead, Vietnam faces many other formidable challenges. The quality of its labour force at the middle to higher value-added end of global supply chains leaves much to be desired. Like India, Vietnam also continues to have a very large informal sector, very vulnerable to the real and imminent employment and employability related challenges caused by new and rapidly changing artificial intelligence based robotic and other technologies.

Alongside these political and economic challenges, newly emerging challenges include rapid digitisation and urbanisation which is also quickening its pace. At the current pace, it is estimated that about 50 per cent of Vietnam's population will live in urban areas by the beginning of the fourth decade of the 21st century which includes the centennial year of its independence. While this obviously presents opportunities for national growth and an improved quality of life for some of its population, a range of concomitant problems have also emerged, such as increasing income disparity, lack of basic infrastructure and services, lack of decent housing, increasing health problems due to pollution as well as environmental degradation. These challenges will likely increase with further urbanisation.

As a result of all the above and its recent political uncertainty and turbulence, the country is in danger of being stuck in the proverbial 'lower middle-income trap' unless it quickly, and simultaneously or in rapid succession, stabilises politically and moves up the economic value-added ladder.

THE WAY FORWARD

Vietnam urgently needs a bold doi moi 2.0, which encompasses not just its economy but also includes urgently needed political and institutional reforms. If it wishes to attain genuine ‘developed’ country status by 2045, Vietnam will not only need significantly increased GDP and GDP per capita income growth and a higher ranking on UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), all of which it is likely to continue accomplishing, but also a genuine and sustainable widening and deepening of the national democratic space in addition to the achievement of most, if not all, the globally agreed SDGs before or by 2030. Notwithstanding the country’s current very challenging political, economic, social and foreign policy conjuncture, there is little doubt that ordinary Vietnamese citizens will, as always, be key players in overcoming its current formidable challenges, continuing to be key positive drivers of the country’s future societal transformation.



* This article was last updated on 28 August 2024.

NOTES

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